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COMMITTING TO DOING GOOD AND DOING
WELL: FIDUCIARY DUTY IN BENEFIT
CORPORATIONS
Brett H. McDonnell*
ABSTRACT
Can someone running a business do good while doing well? Can
they benefit society and the environment while still making money?
Supporters of social enterprises believe the answer is yes, as these
companies aim at making money for shareholders, while also
pursuing other social benefits. Since 2010, states have begun to enact
statutes creating the “benefit corporation” as a new legal form, one
designed to fit social enterprises. Benefit corporations proclaim to
the world that they will pursue both social good and profits, and
those who run them have a fiduciary duty to consider a broad range
of social interests as they make their decisions, rather than a duty to
focus solely on increasing shareholder value. Does this novel
fiduciary duty effectively commit these businesses to doing good?
How will courts actually apply this duty in practice? Will this new
duty accomplish its goals without unduly high costs?
This article is among the first to analyze in detail the fiduciary duty
provisions in several versions of these new benefit corporation
statutes. It compares duties in benefit corporations to duties in
traditional corporations in the leading categories of fiduciary duty
cases. It argues that there is likely to be a modest “flattening” in the
risk of liability for directors and officers of benefit corporations.
That is, as compared to the level of risk in ordinary corporations, the
risk of being held personally liable will be greater for decisions
where that risk is smaller in ordinary corporations, while the risk of
liability will be smaller for decisions where that risk is greatest in
ordinary corporations.

* I thank Claire Hill, Dan Kleinberger, Paul Rubin, and Dan Schwarcz for helpful
comments. I also thank the participants in the Minnesota State Bar Association
working group which drafted the proposed Minnesota benefit corporation statute
discussed in this article—their insights throughout that process have strongly informed
my thinking here.
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The article then asks whether the statutes strike the proper balance in
holding directors and officers accountable. The statutes could be too
strong if they scare off investors and managers. They could be too
weak if they allow managers to proclaim their virtue while ignoring
their duties with no fear of legal sanctions. Neither possibility can be
dismissed, but this paper argues that the statutes have got it just
right. They create enough risk of liability that managers must pay
attention to their legal duties, allowing courts to help shape norms of
appropriate behavior, while not imposing such high risk that this
promising new business form becomes unattractive.
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INTRODUCTION
Can someone running a business do good while doing well? Can
they benefit society and their environment while still making money?
Much of the time the answer is clearly yes. Since even before Adam
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Smith,1 we have known that under the right conditions, individuals
seeking their own profit may be driven, as if by an invisible hand, to
help society as a whole. But the conditions are not always right, and
sometimes businesses which focus only on maximizing profits for their
owners will seriously harm other persons or the environment.2
To help make the dilemma more concrete, consider a hypothetical
ice cream company named Jen & Berry’s which has developed a loyal
following in part because its products are seen as environmentally
friendly. However, the containers the company uses are nonbiodegradable and significantly harmful to the environment. More
environmentally-friendly containers are available, but at greater cost.
Jen & Berry’s customers have shown no concern about these containers,
so switching to the less harmful product would significantly increase
costs with no benefit in higher revenues. How should managers of a
business faced with such a choice proceed?
Past answers have split between two extremes, embodied in two
legal forms of business associations.3 For-profit corporations focus on
what their name suggests, making a profit, whereas non-profit
corporations focus on doing some defined social good. But recently,
some entrepreneurs and investors have become interested in developing
businesses that have dual goals of making a profit for their investors
while also pursuing social goods, sometimes narrowly and sometimes
broadly defined. Businesses with this dual purpose have come to be
called “social enterprises.”
Lawyers and legislators have begun to invent hybrid legal forms to
meet the needs of these hybrid businesses. The most important of these
new forms is the benefit corporation. Benefit corporation statutes build
on ordinary for-profit corporation statutes, with benefit corporations
incorporated under ordinary corporation statutes, and corporate law
rules largely governing benefit corporations. Benefit corporation
statutes, however, add several new features. First, benefit corporations
must have a purpose beyond simply pursuing profit. Second, they must
1. Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
(1776); see also Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, Or, Private Vices, Publick
Benefits (1714).
2. After World War II, economists formalized the precise conditions under which
Smith’s hypothesis held. Those conditions are highly unlikely to be met. See Kenneth J.
Arrow & Frank H. Hahn, General Competitive Analysis (1971).
3. Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit
Corps, 25 Regent U. L. Rev. 269, 280 (2012-2013).
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regularly report how they have attempted to pursue that purpose.
Finally, their officers and directors have a duty to consider and pursue
the interests of a variety of stakeholders beyond just shareholders.4
This article is among the first to take an in-depth look at the last of
those legal features, the creation of a new fiduciary duty for those who
run benefit corporations. What do we hope that new duty will
accomplish, how will it work in practice, and what are the chances this
duty will accomplish what we want without creating unduly damaging
unintended consequences? Those are the questions this article seeks to
answer.
The exploration of these questions begins in Part II with an
overview of social enterprise and of the various new legal forms that
have been created in response, including low profit limited liability
companies (L3Cs), flexible purpose corporations, and social purpose
corporations, as well as benefit corporations. This part explores what the
new fiduciary duty for benefit corporations is meant to accomplish. It
can be seen as a response to two different problems which benefit
corporations face. One is a standard problem of trust in the face of
asymmetric information. Those who run benefit corporations want to
attract investors and customers, and a number of investors and
customers want to do business with companies pursuing the social
benefits which benefit corporations say they are pursuing. However,
outside investors and customers cannot necessarily tell whether those
running any particular business are doing what they say they will do.
The existence of a legally enforceable legal duty may act as a
commitment device to assure investors and customers. A second
problem is that in the face of a variety of competing interests, it is often
not clear what managers acting in good faith should do to follow
through on their commitments. The law may help provide some
guidance. The law must try to accomplish these two aims, though,
without providing such detailed and draconian standards that managers
avoid becoming involved in benefit corporations (for fear of liability for
violating their duty), or if they do become involved, they take unduly
costly measures to protect against the risk of legal liability. Thus, the
new fiduciary duties for benefit corporation directors and officers face a
difficult balancing act.

4.

See infra, section I.C.
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Part III presents a detailed analysis of the fiduciary duty provisions
under three benefit corporation statutes: a Model Act which has been
largely followed by most states which have adopted benefit corporation
laws to date,5 Delaware’s new benefit corporation act,6 and Minnesota’s
new benefit corporation act,7 which has some interestingly different
elements. It compares how these statutory provisions may be applied
with the existing corporate law of fiduciary duties for three types of
circumstances: ordinary operating decisions, transactions in which a
director or officer has a conflicting interest, and changes of corporate
control.8 The analysis suggests a modest flattening of the risk of liability
is likely to occur in benefit corporations relative to ordinary for-profit
corporations. That is, in ordinary operating decisions where the risk of
liability is very low for ordinary corporations, the risk will be slightly
elevated in benefit corporations. In conflict transactions where the risk
of liability is highest, the risk in benefit corporations may be slightly
lowered (hopefully not much), or at least the damages that might be
recovered are likely to be lowered relative to the level in ordinary
corporations. In changes of control situations, the direction of the
change in liability risk may vary by the circumstances of a proposed
change in control. Shareholders of benefit corporations may find it
harder to argue that they will receive too low a premium, but they may
be able to claim that some proposed transactions will harm other
stakeholders.
Part IV goes on to ask whether, in light of the legal analysis of Part
III, the duty provisions are likely to achieve their desired goals without
unduly bad unintended consequences. It suggests that there are some
reasons to fear that the risk of liability may be too high (possibly scaring
off managers), too low (failing to encourage appropriate behavior), or
5. Model Benefit Corp. Legislation (2013) (hereinafter Model Act), reprinted in
William H. Clark, Jr., et. al., White Paper: The Need and Rationale for the Benefit
Corporation: Why It Is the Legal Form that Best Addresses the Need of Social
Entrepreneurs, Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public at Appendix A (2013).
6. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, Subchapter XV (2013) (hereafter Delaware Act).
7. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 304A (West 2014) (hereafter Minnesota Act). Note that the
Minnesota Act is currently under consideration by the Minnesota legislature and that
passage appears likely this session. The author is a member of the state bar association
that drafted the Minnesota Act.
8. See generally Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Fiduciary Duties: The
Emerging Jurisprudence, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law
133 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012) (outlining principles of corporate
law fiduciary duty).
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even both too high and too low (scaring off legitimate managers while
failing to change the behavior of illegitimate ones). However, it goes on
to argue that there is also reason to believe that the law, if applied
sensitively by courts, will strike a proper balance. There are many
protection devices in the statutes, along with existing law, to keep
liability from getting out of hand and scaring off managers. But, there
remains just enough risk of liability to get the attention of managers,
given the bad consequences that could follow in the unlikely event that
they are held liable. This risk of liability both offers some deterrence
directly, but probably more importantly it also focuses attention on
courts. In their fiduciary duty opinions, even if they rarely hold directors
or officers liable, the courts will be able to draw upon emerging best
practices to scold managers who have fallen short of those standards,
and thereby help articulate and encourage conformity with emerging
norms of conduct for those who run benefit corporations. The law of
duty may thus both help discourage bad faith operators of benefit
corporations and offer guidance to those acting in good faith who are
unsure what their duty requires, while doing so without imposing the
harsh penalties of the law too often. This sort of legislating by
sermonizing is an important part of how courts, especially Delaware
courts, do their job with ordinary for-profit corporations.9 One hopes
they will be able to perform a similar balancing act for benefit
corporations.
I. OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
For many decades there has been debate over what freedom
traditional corporations have to balance seeking profit with seeking
other sorts of social values. In the thirties, Berle and Dodd engaged in a
classic academic debate over whether the duty of corporate directors
was owed only to shareholders or to other affected stakeholders as
well.10 A new version of the debate erupted in the eighties with the
growth of first hostile takeovers and then defenses against such
9.
10.

See infra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
See Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers As Powers In Trust, 44 Harv. L. Rev.
1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932); see also Antony Page, New Corporate Forms and Green
Business, 37 Wm. & Mary Envt’l L. & Pol’y Rev. 347, 355 (2013) (discussing Berle’s
and Dodd’s debate in the context of social enterprise).
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takeovers. One component of the debate was whether target company
boards could use non-shareholder interests, especially those of
employees, as a justification for guarding against takeovers that looked
quite profitable for their shareholders.11 During this period, many states
adopted “constituency statutes,” which allow boards to consider nonshareholder interests.12 More recently, there has been a growing
corporate social responsibility movement as corporate management
begins to see the long-term economic benefits of socially responsible
investment.13 Today’s social enterprises can be seen as the latest
development in this ongoing history, a new way of thinking about the
relationship between seeking profit and seeking other social goods.
A growing number of businesses, mostly start-ups but also
including some more established companies, are engaged in what has
come to be called “social enterprise.”14 The defining characteristic of
social enterprises is that they aim both to make a profit, though perhaps
a reduced profit, for equity investors and also to do some social good.
The kinds of social good that such businesses aim to achieve vary
tremendously, from narrow and focused initiatives to quite broad and
vague intentions of social betterment.15 Sometimes it can be both, or in
between. So for instance our ice cream maker, Jen & Berry’s, may want
11. See Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and
False Fears, 1999 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 85, 102-08 (surveying academic debate).
12. Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee
Governance, 30 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1227, 1231 (2004); Comm. on Corporate Laws,
Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 Bus. Law. 2253, 2263-66
(1990).
13. Ian B. Lee, The Role of the Public Interest in Corporate Law, in Research
Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law 106 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H.
McDonnell eds., 2012); David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility,
46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 523, 530-31 (2011).
14. See generally Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter? 1, 4-10
(Univ. of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-06, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstra=2389024 (discussing social enterprise generally); see also Robert
Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 59, 65 (2010);
Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on
Emerging Corporate Entities in Europe and the United States and the Case for the
Benefit Corporation, 4 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 639, 644-50 (2013); Social
Enterprise: A Global Comparison 88 (Janelle A. Kerlin ed., 2009); Muhammad Yunus
with Karl Weber, Building Social Business: The New Kind of Capitalism That Serves
Humanity’s Most Pressing Needs xv-xvi (2010).
15. See infra notes 40-42, 55 and accompanying text (providing typical definitions
of the social good to be pursued in benefit corporations).
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to commit to products and processes which are environmentally
sustainable, foods made from fair-trade ingredients produced by smallscale farms, or both.
Social enterprises have a lot of attractions. They allow
entrepreneurs, investors, customers, and employees to do good while
still doing well. That is, they can advance some objectives which they
find morally attractive, while still earning a profit (entrepreneurs and
investors), earning a decent wage (employees) and/or buying a useful
good or service (customers). But social enterprises face serious
challenges that neither pure for-profits nor pure non-profits have to
worry about. The core problem is that for some decisions, increasing
profit and advancing the enterprise’s stated social goods may conflict.
There are tradeoffs to be made, but who will make those tradeoffs, and
how should they make them? In the first instance, a company’s
managers will presumably be the persons to make the hard choices, but
how are they supposed to make them? And how are others, especially
investors and customers, supposed to trust that the managers are making
those decisions in a way that they find acceptable? If managers cannot
credibly commit to a course of action that investors and customers find
attractive, they may not be able to attract investors and customers.16
Monitoring of management and punishment of behavior that violates the
promised mix of profit and doing good may be too costly. Of course, the
issue of monitoring managers is not new, and many mechanisms are
available to address the problem.17 Business association law is one such
mechanism.
A. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND TRADITIONAL LEGAL FORMS OF BUSINESS
There has been concern that existing legal forms of business
association do not fit well with the needs of social enterprises.18 The
non-profit corporation is clearly inappropriate, as it does not allow for
equity investors to earn a profit. Cooperatives, under traditional legal
rules, also restrict the ability to admit outside equity investors. Various
16. Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms For Social Enterprise, 62 Emory L.J.
681, 684 (2013).
17. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics, Organization & Management 126203 (1992).
18. See, e.g., Yockey, supra note 14, at 12-13; Esposito, supra note 14, at 681-82;
Reiser, supra note 16, at 685-89.
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forms of unincorporated entities, of which the leading alternative is now
the limited liability company (“LLC”), provide more promising
flexibility. The LLC allows firms to pursue any legal purpose, with
whatever mix of for-profit and non-profit goals they choose. They also
provide great flexibility in management structure, scope of fiduciary
duty, financial structure, and exit rights. Although I will not focus much
attention on LLCs in this article, they do provide a viable alternative for
social enterprises.
However, the very flexibility of LLCs presents some problems.
Designing a detailed set of rules to fit the needs of a specific enterprise
will typically require expensive legal representation, and much
uncertainty is still likely to surround the resulting organization insofar as
its lawyers have devised unique solutions which have not been tested by
prior experience. Outside investors, customers, and employees will be
hard-pressed to understand the complex details of a particularized legal
structure.19 One of the key benefits of having a variety of legal forms of
business associations is that they provide a smorgasbord of standardized
solutions to the problems of firms. Firms can choose the form that best
fits their needs without having to engage in too much specialized
lawyering, and various stakeholders will be able to infer much about the
business from the organizational form it has chosen.20 Insofar as social
enterprises are a new kind of business with a distinctly new set of
challenges, the flexible default rules of the LLC may not fit their needs
well.21

19.
20.

Reiser, supra note 15, at 689.
Of course, at first there will still be much uncertainty surrounding a new legal
form like the benefit corporation. However, as experience accumulates in markets and
courts, this uncertainty should decrease.
21. This discussion suggests that a desirable form might be a benefit LLC.
Paralleling the benefit corporation, a benefit LLC would start with the legal base of an
LLC, but would add specific features to meet the organizational needs of social
enterprises. This would address the drawbacks of standard LLCs discussed in the text,
and might well be more attractive than benefit corporations insofar as the LLC is
proving more attractive than the corporate form for most newer businesses, as discussed
in the following paragraphs, and most social enterprises tend to be start-up companies.
So far, only Maryland has adopted a benefit LLC form, but others may well follow.
Much of the analysis of benefit corporations in this paper may be relevant for benefit
LLCs. See J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise,
Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 42-43
(2012). Another potential benefit of benefit LLCs might be that management by
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The other main traditional legal form of business association is of
course the for-profit corporation. Corporations still dominate among
large public companies, and many smaller and newer businesses are still
corporations as well, although LLCs are increasingly common outside
the sphere of large publicly-traded companies.22 Corporations have
many advantages, including a well-developed body of law, which is well
adapted to a business which wants to pool equity investments from a
large number of sources and put that money to work in a relatively large,
hierarchical business association. However, the corporate form also has
significant disadvantages. Some of these are shared with all smaller
businesses (insofar as social enterprises tend to be small).23 The
hierarchical structure does not fit small businesses well, and the
corporate tax is typically less attractive than partnership taxation, to
name two leading issues.24
Other problems with corporations are particular to social
enterprises. Above all, current understanding among most in the U.S. is
that the defining objective of corporations is to maximize profit or
shareholder wealth. This understanding is less true in other countries, it
may have been less true historically in the U.S.,25 and it is disputed in
the U.S. today.26 The shareholder wealth maximization norm has little
legal binding effect for most decisions, because the business judgment
rule protects most decisions by boards and officers, even if in their heart
of hearts those decision-makers are not pursuing shareholders’ interests
as single-mindedly as the legal norm suggests they should. Only in
limited situations involving changes of control, or protections against
involuntary changes of control, does the shareholder wealth
maximization norm have some potential legal bite.27 And even there, in

members could be a way of ensuring that decisions are made by those who care about
the goals of the organization. Reiser, supra note 16, at 712-13.
22. Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation (2010).
23. This is why the benefit LLC may prove useful.
24. Corporations can choose to be S corporations and thereby be taxed mostly like
partnerships, but significant restrictions apply in order to be able to do that.
25. Johnson, supra note 3, at 276-77.
26. See, e.g., id. at 273-74; Lynn Stout, The Shareholder Value Myth: How Putting
Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public 16 (2012).
27. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33-34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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the thirty or so states with constituency statutes, directors and officers
are probably protected if they take other interests into consideration.28
Nonetheless, even if corporate managers may take into account the
interests of non-shareholder constituencies, especially in states with
constituency statutes, they certainly do not have to do so in any legally
binding way (except insofar as looking out for the interests of other
groups is itself necessary for increasing profit for shareholders). The
founders of a social enterprise, though, may want to commit the
business to pursuing the interests of others besides shareholders. They
may want to commit in part because they care themselves, and they
want the business to do so even after they have lost full control of it.
They may also want to credibly commit in order to encourage the
involvement of investors, customers, and employees who want to be
involved in an enterprise which cares about more than just the interests
of shareholders. Traditional corporation law provides little assistance in
helping social enterprises create such a credible commitment.29
B. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND NEW LEGAL FORMS OF BUSINESS
Given these gaps in all of the leading traditional legal forms of
business association from the perspective of social enterprises, it is no
great surprise that in recent years a number of states have experimented
with new legal forms of business association. To date, at least, these
new forms are all rooted in one of the existing forms, but they add new
rules on top of existing rules to provide solutions for the special
challenges facing social enterprises. Low-profit limited liability
28. I say “probably” because although they have been around for several decades,
constituency statutes have been little used in court and have received almost no judicial
interpretation. Both legal and business practitioners seem wary of how much legal
protection constituency protections would really give if push came to shove in court. A
leading example is the sale of Ben & Jerry’s to a corporation focused on traditional
profit maximization. The founders claimed they felt forced into the sale by the legal
injunction to maximize shareholder wealth despite the fact that Vermont had a
constituency statute that was called the Ben & Jerry’s statute and was enacted to protect
companies from precisely that pressure to sell out. It is unclear, however, to what extent
the claimed concern of the founders was a consequence of genuine legal uncertainty as
opposed to a useful pretext. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New
Tricks? Applying Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise
Legislation, 13 Tenn. J. Bus. L. 221, 237-39 (2012).
29. Founders of a company can, of course, try to structure the business to create a
commitment on their own; the point, though, is that the law does little to help them.
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companies (“L3Cs”) were an early version which saw much enthusiasm.
L3Cs were created to help encourage “program related investments” by
charities along with investments by for-profit investors. However, a
number of lawyers and academics have raised serious questions as to
whether the rules of L3Cs actually help achieve compliance with the
restrictions surrounding program related investments.30 One state so far,
Maryland, has created benefit LLCs, which resemble benefit
corporations (as described below), but grafted onto LLCs rather than
corporations.
The leading legal response to date has probably been the benefit
corporation. A number of states have adopted benefit corporation laws,
with more considering them. Most states have based their laws on a
Model Act created by lawyers working with B Lab, a non-profit which
is the leading certifier of companies that hold themselves out as social
enterprises.31 The leading state for public corporations, Delaware,
recently passed its own statute that diverges in significant ways from B
Lab’s Model Act.32 All benefit corporations on the general lines of the
Model Act, including Delaware, must pursue “general public benefit,”
which as we shall see is very broadly defined indeed, although they may
also choose to identify one or more specific benefits which they will
particularly pursue. Two states have enacted statutes that do not require
the pursuit of a general public benefit broadly defined, but instead focus
only on specific benefits defined by each company. These are called
flexible purpose corporations in California and social purpose
corporations in Washington.33 Minnesota’s statutes34 provide for both

30. Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New Clothes”
on the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 Del. J. Corp. L. 879, 896-97 (2010);
Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy or
Perversion?, 63 Ark. L. Rev. 243, 250 (2010); J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal,
The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate
Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 Vt. L.
Rev. 273, 283-84 (2010).
31. B Lab, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-bcorps (last visited Dec. 1, 2014).
32. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 §§ 361-368.
33. See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, The Next Big Thing: Flexible-Purpose
Corporations, 2 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 55, 57 (2012).
34. The author was involved in the bar association committee which drafted the
Minnesota legislation.
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the broad version, called general benefit corporations, and the more
focused version, called specific benefit corporations.
Though there are significant variations in detail, all of these benefit
corporation statutes have several main elements in common. These
include a provision that corporate purpose must involve pursuing other
interests beyond shareholder wealth maximization, promulgation of
fiduciary duties and enforcement provisions to require pursuit of that
broader purpose, and a requirement for a regular (generally annual)
report on how the company has pursued that broader purpose. In the
remainder of this section, I will briefly describe these defining features
of benefit corporations, before turning in more detail to the competing
fiduciary duty provisions of several statutes in the next section.
Benefit corporations must contain a provision in their articles or
certificate of incorporation (“charter”) stating that they are a benefit
corporation.35 An amendment to the charter to convert a corporation into
a benefit corporation must receive a super-majority vote, typically two
thirds,36 but ninety percent in Delaware.37 Similarly, a charter
amendment to eliminate benefit corporation status must receive a supermajority vote, typically two thirds.38 In some states, dissidents to these
votes receive dissenters’ rights, and thus can give up their shares in
return for the fair value of the shares.39
As noted, a core feature of benefit corporations is that their
corporate purpose extends beyond maximizing shareholder wealth
created by the corporation. Under the Model Act, “[a] benefit
corporation shall have a purpose of creating general public benefit.”40
“General public benefit” is defined as a “material positive impact on
society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a thirdparty standard, from the business and operations of a benefit
corporation.”41 Most statutes closely follow this Model Act provision.
Delaware’s general benefit language is rather different, referring to “the
35. Model Act § 103; Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 362(a) (West 2013); Minn. Stat.
Ann., § 304A.101 sub. 1 (West 2015).
36. Model Act § 104; Minn. Stat Ann., § 304A.103 sub. 1.
37. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 363(a).
38. Model Act § 105; Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 363(c); Minn. Stat. Ann., §
304A.104 sub. 1.
39. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 363(b); Minn. Stat. Ann., § 304A.103 sub. 3, 104
sub. 3.
40. Model Act § 201(a).
41. Model Act § 102.
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best interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct . .
. .”42 Under the Model Act, a benefit corporation may but need not
provide that in addition to general public benefit it will also pursue a
“specific public benefit.”43 Delaware is an exception, requiring
companies to both pursue the general benefit just noted plus one or more
specific public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.44
Under the rather different flexible purpose corporation model, there is
no requirement to pursue general public benefit. Rather, the corporation
need only identify one or more specific benefits which it will pursue.45
In our Jen & Berry’s example, let us suppose that the company has
committed itself (somewhat) specifically to products and processes that
are environmentally sustainable. In a flexible or social purpose
corporation (or in Minnesota a specific benefit corporation), that could
be the extent of its commitment. If it were a benefit corporation under
the Model Act or Delaware (or in Minnesota a general benefit
corporation), in addition to this specific benefit Jen & Berry’s would
also be committed to pursuing general public benefit as defined above.
One of the main needs for social enterprises is to find ways to
credibly commit to pursue goals beyond shareholder wealth
maximization. Merely stating a broader purpose is not enough, a
company must be able to credibly commit to actually pursuing that
purpose. The benefit corporation statutes have two basic strategies for
helping companies commit: reporting and duty. The first strategy uses
public disclosure. The statutes require benefit corporations to regularly
make reports on their pursuit of public benefit. In most states the report
must be annual.46 The statutes differ somewhat in the detail they impose
concerning these reports, but they generally require that a company
prepare its report in accord with standards promulgated by an

42.
43.

Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 362(a).
Model Act § 102. The same is true for general benefit corporations in
Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann., § 304A.101 sub. 1.
44. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 362(a) (West 2013).
45. See Cal. Corp. Code §2602(b)(2) (West 2013); the same is true for specific
benefit corporations in Minnesota, see Minn. Stat. Ann. § 304A.104 sub. 2 (West
2015).
46. Model Act § 401(a); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 304A.301 sub 1. In Delaware the
requirement is only biennial, though corporations may provide for more frequent filing,
see Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 366(b).
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independent third party.47 Delaware differs on this point—it allows
companies to require a third-party standard in their certificate, but does
not require it.48 Moreover, corporations following a specific rather than
general benefit purpose are not required to use a third-party standard,49
because no such standard will be available for most of the various
possible specific benefits one may imagine.
These public reports work as a commitment device within a
reputational market-based strategy. A public report may help reveal
whether a company is living up to its stated purpose. If it is not,
investors, customers, or employees may decide not to do business with
that company, or may want to push it to live up to its ideals.50 Of course,
the market alone could create incentives for companies to publish such
reports anyway, and the market could also develop standards for such
reports. Indeed, the statutes themselves rely upon such privatelydeveloped standards.51 However, as in disclosure-based securities law,
there may be a coordination benefit to having the government help in
standard-setting, since there is an externality present in having standards
followed by many companies within a category, so that outside
constituents can compare like with like.52 An open question is whether
the statutory strategy of relying on privately-generated standards will
lead to adequate coordination and public standards which allow
interested persons to compare performance across companies. Also, the
creation of standards presents a quandary: excessive quantification may
lead to gaming the numbers and ignoring important factors that are not
counted in the numbers, while vague qualitative standards may not
convey much credible information. To date, the statutes do not do much
to address this dilemma. However, there is another, maybe greater,
benefit of having a legal reporting requirement. Companies which
commit fraud within such required reports will presumably open

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Model Act § 401(a); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 304A.301.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 366(b), (c) (West 2013).
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 304A.301 sub. 2 (West 2015).
See Reiser, supra note 16, at 707-08.
For example, B Lab is a private company that provides certification to social
enterprises. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
52. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law 303-04 (1991).
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themselves up to anti-fraud suits, providing a potentially important way
to police the accuracy of such disclosure.53
C. AN OVERVIEW OF DUTY IN BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
The other statutory commitment strategy is fiduciary duty. As
analyzed above, it is already largely true under most corporation statutes
that in most circumstances directors and officers may pursue objectives
beyond shareholder wealth maximization. However, under the benefit
corporation statutes they must pursue the general or specific public
benefits described above.54 Failure to do so may constitute a violation of
fiduciary duty and may leave the directors, officers, or corporation
subject to a suit for violation of that duty. There is much uncertainty
concerning the scope of the duties created and their judicial
enforcement. The next two sections will explore that uncertainty. Here, I
describe the basic features of the duty provisions under the Model Act,
the Delaware Act, and the Minnesota Act.
The Model Act directs that “[i]n discharging the duties of their
respective positions and in considering the best interests of the benefit
corporation, the [directors] (1) shall consider the effects of any action or
inaction upon” a list of persons including the shareholders, employees,
customers, “community and societal factors,” the environment, longterm interests, and “the ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish
its general public benefit purpose and any specific public benefit
purpose.”55 The Act creates a “benefit enforcement proceeding” for
violations of duties under the Act or for “failure of a benefit corporation
to pursue or create general public benefit or a specific public benefit
purpose set forth in its articles . . . .”56 Only the corporation itself, a
director, or shareholders owning more than 2% of shares in a class or
series has standing to sue, 57 although the articles or bylaws may grant
standing to others.

53. None of the three statutes we consider here provide an explicit cause of action
for fraud in a benefit report. However, other laws may create such a cause of action. In
particular, it would seem that there is a good argument that Rule 10b-5 should apply.
54. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
55. Model Act § 301(a). Section 303(a) imposes the same duty upon officers.
56. Model Act § 102.
57. Model Act § 305(b).
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The Model Act creates a variety of restrictions on suits to enforce
this duty. Directors and officers are exonerated from personal liability
for monetary damages (although the articles may allow for personal
liability) for “any action or inaction in the course of performing the
duties” under the Act if s/he “performed the duties of office in
compliance with” the Act, or for “failure of the benefit corporation to
pursue or create general public benefit or specific public benefit.”58 The
corporation itself is also “not liable for monetary damages . . . for any
failure of the benefit corporation to pursue or create general public
benefit or a specific public benefit.”59 Thus, benefit enforcement
proceedings are largely limited to injunctive remedies (although we
shall see some possible exceptions to this in the next section). The
Model Act also explicitly makes the business judgment rule applicable
to the duties created under it.60 It does not explicitly make applicable
director exculpation clauses61 which have become standard for public
corporations—we shall discuss these below.
Duties under the Delaware Act are defined rather differently.
Delaware introduces a balancing requirement, which at first glance
seems to set a tougher standard than the Model Act:
The board of directors shall manage or direct the business and
affairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the
pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public
benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.62
However, the Delaware Act then goes far in deflecting possible
liability for failing to meet his balancing requirement, both by rejecting
any standing for persons having an interest affected by the corporation’s
conduct,63 and also by specifying that a director “will be deemed to
58.
59.
60.
61.

Model Act §§ 301(c), 303(c).
Model Act § 305(a)(2).
Model Act § 301(e).
These clauses waive the personal liability of directors for monetary damage,
with exceptions to that waiver, including exceptions for violations of the duty of
loyalty, illegal behavior, and action not in good faith. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)
(West 2011). Such an exculpation clause may seem unnecessary given the exoneration
of directors from monetary damages under the Model Act, although we shall see that
there is reason to doubt that.
62. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 365(a) (West 2013).
63. None of the acts provide standing to enforce the duties created to anyone other
than shareholders. The concern is that more generous standing may lead to too many
suits. Pragmatically that seems hard to avoid—the range of stakeholder interests is vast,
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satisfy such director’s fiduciary duties to stockholders and the
corporation if such director’s decision is both informed and disinterested
and not such that no person of ordinary, sound judgment would
approve.”64 Moreover, the statute goes on to recognize that a § 102(b)(7)
exculpation clause may apply to this duty, and the certificate may
further state “that any disinterested failure to satisfy this section shall
not, for the purposes of § 102(b)(7) or § 145 of this title, constitute an
act or omission not in good faith, or a breach of the duty of loyalty.”65
This should protect directors against possible application of the evolving
concept of good faith, which plaintiffs have tried to use to get around
exculpation clauses.
The Minnesota Act has elements of both the Model and Delaware
Acts, as well as its own unique provisions. Like the Model Act, it
provides that directors shall consider the effects of proposed conduct on
a list of persons and interests, including both general and any applicable
specific public benefit.66 Like both the Model and Delaware Acts, it
limits standing only to shareholders.67 Like the Model Act, it provides
that the corporation itself is not liable for monetary damages for any
failure to pursue or create a general or specific public benefit.68 Unlike
either of the other acts, Minnesota’s Act creates a cause of action against
directors if the corporation has “for an unreasonably long period of time
failed to pursue” its general or specific benefit.69 There is no limitation
on monetary damages for directors or officers. However, it does make
clear that the business judgment rule applies, that exculpation clauses, if
present, apply, and borrows from Delaware in providing that

and some of the stakeholder groups are quite large and ill-defined, so there would be
almost no limit as to who could sue. However, this is actually a pretty big limitation,
and shows that ultimately the benefit corporation concept does not stray all that far
from the concept of for-profit corporations. If benefit corporations are to be run for the
benefit of a range of stakeholders, why not give them the right to enforce what is owed
to them? See Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate
Governance, 68 Bus. Law. 1007, 1021-22 (2013); Reiser, supra note 16, at 717-20;
Johnson, supra note 3, at 292.
64. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 365(b).
65. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §365(c).
66. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 304A.201 sub. 1 (West 2015).
67. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 304A.202 sub. 1(a).
68. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 304A.202 sub. 1(b).
69. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 304A.202 sub. 2.
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exculpation clauses may state that “any disinterested failure” to satisfy
duty under the Act shall not constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty.”70
These fiduciary duty provisions raise a number of questions as to
how they may be applied if ever tested in court. We now turn to some of
those questions.
II. HOW MIGHT COURTS APPLY THE DUTY PROVISIONS?
We shall consider how the benefit corporation fiduciary duty
provisions might affect the potential for legal liability in three sorts of
situations, following the main classification of fiduciary duties for
ordinary corporations: standard operating decisions, situations involving
conflicts of interest, and potential changes of control. Let us start with
an ultra-quick overview of how the law handles these situations for
ordinary corporations, to establish a baseline for comparing the benefit
corporation statutes.71 In our analysis, we shall want to distinguish the
potential for personal monetary liability for directors and officers,72 for
monetary liability for the corporation itself, and for injunctive relief.
This distinction is important because the threat of personal monetary
liability will generally be more effective in grabbing the attention of
officers and directors. As we shall discuss in the next section, that
attention-grabbing can be a good or a bad thing—it may help deter duty
violations, but it may also scare away potential directors and officers
from becoming involved with benefit corporations. That is why
achieving the optimal balance under fiduciary duty law is so hard, and
so crucial.
A. DUTY IN ORDINARY CORPORATIONS
The baseline comparison for ordinary operating decisions is that
director personal liability is extremely unlikely, and corporate liability or
injunctive relief are not that much more likely. Non-conflicted ordinary
decisions are protected by the business judgment rule, under which
plaintiffs need to show either gross negligence in becoming informed
before making a decision or the irrationality of the substance of the
decision. These are deliberately very hard claims to make successfully,
70.
71.
72.

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 304A.201 subs. 4, 5.
See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 8.
I shall sometimes use “managers” or “management” to refer to directors and
officers collectively.
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and plaintiffs rarely win.73 The duty of care has been understood to
mainly create a focus on procedure, with the board expected to
reasonably inform itself before making a decision. This duty to inform is
protected by a gross negligence standard that makes liability quite
unlikely, although the famous Van Gorkom decision in Delaware did
open up the potential for plaintiff victories.74 The business judgment rule
also has a substantive component which makes liability quite unlikely.
Defendants are protected from claims that a decision was a bad deal for
the corporation as long as they could rationally believe that it was a
good deal. This is essentially the waste standard, which sets a very low
bar for defendants to justify their decisions, although in a significant
post-financial crisis case involving Citigroup the Delaware Chancery
Court did allow a waste claim to survive the initial motion to dismiss.75
It is the weakness of this duty that has caused many to argue that
ordinary corporations are already free to pursue social goods to their
hearts’ content, free from fear of suit.76 Thus, even if Jen & Berry’s was
not a benefit corporation, its managers could still choose to use the
environmentally-friendly but costly containers. If challenged, they could
argue that they were earning customer good-will which could boost their
sales. This could be total bunk, but courts are extremely unlikely to call
them on it.
Moreover, directors can further protect themselves from personal
liability if a corporation adopts an exculpation clause, under which
plaintiffs will need to show that the directors did not act in good faith in
order to pierce the protections of such a clause.77 In Delaware, at least,
the standard for determining what conduct is not in good faith has been
set so as to make successful claims against directors protected by such a

73. Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1055, 1091
(2006).
74. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873-74 (Del. 1985).
75. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 137-39 (Del.
2009).
76. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
77. Carl Samuel Bjerre, Evaluating the New Director Exculpation Statutes, 73
Cornell L. Rev. 786, 795-96 (1988).
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clause extraordinarily unlikely.78 Most Delaware corporations have
adopted such a clause.79
Where a conflict of interest exists, such that a director or officer is
benefiting at the corporation’s expense, the analysis is different. Here
the duty of loyalty applies, and the defendants lose the protection of
both the business judgment rule and any applicable exculpation clause.
A conflicted transaction is presumptively invalid, and can give rise to
both damages and injunctive relief. However, such consequences can be
avoided if the conflict is cleansed in one of three ways: approval by
informed and disinterested directors, approval by informed shareholders,
or a demonstration to the court that the transaction was fair to the
corporation. Plaintiffs have more chance of prevailing in loyalty cases,
although in most circumstances disinterested director approval will
generally protect the corporation and directors from suit.80
The third major category of duty cases involves potential changes
of control of the corporation. This may either be the board adopting
defenses against hostile takeovers, or the board deciding to sell control
to outsiders. In Delaware, adoption of anti-takeover defenses receives
scrutiny under the Unocal standard,81 in which a court will ask whether
the defense adopted is reasonable in relation to the threat posed to the
corporation. Non-shareholder interests may be considered in evaluating
the threat to the corporation. In practice, the Unocal standard has not
had much strength—defendant boards are generally able to justify their
defenses. In Delaware, sales of control to outsiders get rather more
searching scrutiny under the Revlon standard.82 Under the Revlon
standard, once a sale of control is determined to be inevitable, the board
is bound to maximize the return to shareholders without regard for other
interests the company may have. The court will take a relatively hard
look at the board’s efforts and results in maximizing shareholder value.
However, the Revlon standard only applies when the sale of control is
78.
79.

See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 141-42, 145-47.
Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance
Crisis, 39 Emory L.J. 1155, 1160-61 (1990).
80. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Sanitizing Interested Transactions,
36 Del. J. Corp. L. 903, 908-14 (2011). An exception to this general protection is in
freeze-outs of minority shareholders where even disinterested director approval will
still get searching judicial scrutiny.
81. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
82. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
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inevitable, which is in a limited set of circumstances. Moreover,
directors will only be held personally liable if plaintiffs can show that
they violated their Revlon duty in bad faith—a hard burden for plaintiffs
to prove.83
Now, we turn to ask how being a benefit corporation might change
the legal analysis in each of these three categories. We will at look how
each of the just-noted three categories of duty cases might be modified
under each of the three benefit corporation statutes we are considering.
The analysis is based upon the statutory texts understood in the context
of case law for standard corporations, as just summarized. We do not yet
have case law interpreting the new benefit corporation fiduciary duty
provisions.
B. DUTY FOR ORDINARY OPERATING DECISIONS
We start with ordinary operating decisions. Suppose that Jen &
Berry’s has chosen to be a benefit corporation, and in addition to its
commitment to pursuing general public benefit it has also specified
environmental sustainability in its products and processes as a specific
public benefit. Some Jen & Berry’s shareholders argue that the company
should shift to the more environmentally-friendly but expensive
containers. Are there any conditions under which the managers’ ongoing
decision to use the cheaper, more harmful containers might constitute a
violation of fiduciary duty?
The three statutes we are considering differ somewhat in their basic
statements of what a benefit corporation fiduciary duty requires and the
extent to which directors and officers may be liable for monetary
damages for violating that duty.84 The Model Act requires directors and
officers to consider a wide range of potentially affected groups. For
instance, in the Jen & Berry’s example the environment is included as a
potentially affected group. However, the Model Act seems to absolve
both directors and officers individually as well as the corporation from
monetary damages for failure to pursue those interests.85 Indeed, the
White Paper, which accompanies the Model Act and was written to

83. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009); Lyman Johnson
& Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 167, 192 (2014).
84. See supra section I.C.
85. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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explain the Act, states that “[i]n an effort to restrict potential liability,
the Model Legislation specifically excludes director, officer and
corporate liability for monetary damages.”86 It goes on to say that
excluding director, officer, and corporate liability will “focus courts on
the exclusive remedy of awarding injunctive relief requiring the benefit
corporation to simply live up to the commitments it voluntarily
undertook.”87
However, on closer inspection, the Model Act may not quite so
conclusively protect against monetary liability for either managers or the
corporation. The provisions of the Model Act disclaim liability for
“failure of the benefit corporation to pursue or create general public
benefit or specific public benefit.”88 However, the key standard of
conduct states that directors and officers “shall consider” the effects of
an action on the listed groups.89 Pursuing and creating are different from
considering. The limits on liability provide that plaintiffs may not
collect monetary damages by showing that a company did not try to
advance any particular interest. But what if plaintiffs can show that the
management never even thought about the impact a decision would have
on some stakeholder they were required to consider? In our example,
suppose that there is no sign that Jen & Berry’s has ever considered the
non-biodegradability of its containers as an issue or even considered the
impact on the environment of its choice of containers at all. That may
give rise to a claim under the Model Act.
A further feature of the structure of the Model Act reinforces this
interpretation. The Model Act section on rights of action gives
shareholders standing to pursue claims against the corporation and its
managers on two grounds: (1) failures to pursue or create a public
benefit, and (2) violations of obligations, duties, and standards of
conduct under the Act.90 The exoneration from liability section mirrors
the right of action section in saying that directors and officers are not
personally liable for monetary damages for: (1) failure to pursue or
86. William H. Clark, Jr. et. al., White Paper: The Need and Rationale for the
Benefit Corporation: Why It Is the Legal Form that Best Addresses the Need of Social
Entrepreneurs, Investors, and, Ultimately, the Public 20 (January 2013), available at
http://www.benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Benecit_Corporation_White_Paper_1_1
8_2013.pdf.
87. Id.
88. Model Act §§ 301(c)(2), 303(c)(2) and 305(a)(1) (2013).
89. Model Act §§ 301(a), 303(a).
90. Compare Model Act § 305(a)(1), with § 305(a)(2).
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create public benefit,91 and (2) actions in performing their duties under
the Act if they “performed the duties of office in compliance with . . .
this section”.92 Thus, the seemingly broad exoneration from liability for
failure to follow the duty would seem to be the latter-mentioned parts of
the provisions. But these only apply if the managers have complied with
their duties. So if they have not complied with their duties, i.e. if they
have failed to consider the listed stakeholder interests, then the
exoneration provisions would seem to not apply.
The Minnesota Act has some notable differences in its statement of
the core duty and its limitations on liability for damages. As with the
Model Act, the core duty is to consider a variety of stakeholder
interests.93 For a general benefit corporation, the enumerated list of
interests to consider is quite similar to that in the Model Act. For a
specific benefit corporation, however, the only interests the corporation
must consider (it may consider others) are those of shareholders and the
specific benefit to which the corporation has committed to pursuing.94
Thus, for specific benefit corporations in Minnesota, the scope of what
must be considered is much narrower than benefit corporations under
the Model Act or Delaware Act, or general benefit corporations in
Minnesota.
There is, however, at least one way in which the potential for
liability is greater under the Minnesota Act. Although there is an
exoneration of corporate liability for failure to pursue or create public
benefit,95 there is no exoneration of director or officer liability, as we see
under the Model Act. Moreover, the duties of a benefit corporation
director in Minnesota include not just the duty to consider nonshareholder interests,96 but also a duty to “not give regular, presumptive,
or permanent priority to the pecuniary interests of shareholders.97
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Model Act §§ 301(c)(2) and 305(a)(1).
Model Act §§ 301(c)(1) and 305(c)(1) (2013).
Minn. Stat. Ann., § 304A.201 (West 2015).
Minn. Stat. Ann., § 304A.201 sub. 2.
Minn. Stat. Ann., § 304A.202 sub. 1(b).
Minn. Stat. Ann., § 304A.201 sub. 1(1).
Minn. Stat. Ann., § 304A.201 sub. 1(2). The second of these two grounds for
relief does not refer to directors, but since the directors are responsible for the actions of
a corporation, if the board has caused a corporation to fail to pursue its general or
specific benefit, the relief granted in such circumstances could appropriately be applied
against directors as well as the corporations.

2014] COMMITTING TO DOING GOOD AND DOING WELL

43

Furthermore, the Minnesota section on rights of action has two basic
grounds for relief: (1) if those in control breach their duties under the
Act, and (2) if the corporation has “for an unreasonably long period of
time failed to pursue” its general or specific benefit.98 Thus, while
(absent exculpation provisions, at least) under all three acts managers
face potential monetary liability for failures to consider the mandated
stakeholder interests, only in Minnesota do they also face liability for
giving excessive priority to shareholder pecuniary interests or failing to
pursue non-shareholder interests. The Minnesota Act thus directs courts
to not only examine what factors managers paid attention to in making
their decisions, but also to ask whether the managers actually made
some attempt to advance the mandated interests. Judicial review backed
by monetary damages potentially moves beyond process to the
substance of manager decisions. This is limited, though, by the
requirement that the failure to pursue public benefit is actionable only if
it is sustained “for an unreasonably long period of time.” Thus, one-time
decisions would not be affected. However, the scope of this time
requirement is vague, and may not provide managers that much comfort.
For instance, in our Jen & Berry’s example, if the company has used the
harmful containers for many years, that might well fall within this
prohibition.
One might think of the “consider” versus “pursue or create”
provisions as reflecting the procedural versus substantive dimensions of
the business judgment rule in traditional corporations.99 The duty to
consider non-shareholder interests strengthens the procedural
requirements of the duty of care for benefit corporations, modestly
expanding the risk of liability. The substantive side of the duty of care is
embodied in the extremely weak waste standard: managers may be held
liable for actions which are so irrational that they amount to giving away
corporate assets. Waste claims almost never succeed, although
occasionally they survive motions to dismiss early in a case.100 Even
without the exoneration provisions, for a benefit corporation the waste
standard may, if possible, become even weaker because managers can
legitimately point to non-shareholder interests to justify their decisions.

98.
99.
100.

Minn. Stat. Ann., § 304A.202 sub. 2.
See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
Jamie L. Kastler, The Problem With Waste: Delaware’s Lenient Treatment of
Waste Claims at the Demand Stage of Derivative Litigation, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1899,
1911 (2011).
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Thus, if Jen & Berry’s had instead chosen to use the more expensive
containers and faced suit for that choice arguing that it was a waste of
corporate resources, the board could defend itself by pointing to the
environmental benefits.101
However, there is a flip side to this that could conceivably
strengthen the waste standard: an action that substantively seems to
benefit shareholders could be attacked for failing to pursue or create
other benefits. For instance, in the original Jen & Berry’s example, using
the cheap containers could be attacked for harming the environment.
The Model Act exoneration of liability for such a claim forecloses such
an argument. However, the argument is available in Minnesota. The net
effect for review of the substance of operating decisions as compared
with ordinary corporations is thus mixed in Minnesota. It should be even
harder for plaintiffs in benefit corporations to complain that a decision
hurts shareholders financially, since defendants can point to other
interests to justify their decisions. However, plaintiffs have a new
argument under the benefit corporation statute, arguing that the
corporation has failed to pursue those other interests. The chances of
success for such claims should be quite low, but they are a claim that
one cannot make at all for ordinary corporations, and that one cannot
make as a basis for claims to monetary damages under the Model Act or
Delaware benefit corporation statutes either.
Delaware’s statement of the core duty is rather different from the
Model Act and Minnesota. In those statutes, the board is merely directed
to consider the interests of a number of affected stakeholders. In
Delaware, the board is told it must balance the pecuniary interest of
those materially affected by the corporation’s actions.102 It is not merely
enough to try to analyze the effects an action will have on different
groups, the board must attempt to weigh and balance those effects in
deciding what to do. That would seem to point courts to an inquiry as to
what choice might best balance the competing interests, moving from
merely a focus on the process followed by the board in informing itself
to an actual consideration of what choice is best under the broad
balancing mandate. A court faced with our Jen & Berry’s case would
101. Though if the state has a constituency statute, the board could already defend
themselves. Furthermore, even without such a statute, the posited waste claim would be
extremely unlikely to succeed.
102. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 § 365(a).
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thus have to (somehow) decide whether the higher monetary cost of the
less harmful containers is on balance worth paying. As in Minnesota, I
would expect a Delaware court to follow the example of its waste
jurisprudence and apply a very deferential standard of review to such a
decision should it ever have to engage in such an analysis,103 but it does
create an opportunity for plaintiffs.
Under any of the statutes, even if one can state a claim for a duty
violation and directors and/or officers are not exonerated from personal
liability under the relevant statute, another serious obstacle to holding
anyone liable for damages exists. Defendants must still show that the
duty violation caused harm to them,104 and must quantify that harm in
order to set a specific amount for damages. This raises a puzzle: if the
managers have ignored non-shareholder interests to focus on making a
profit, how has that harmed shareholders, who after all are earning
higher returns as a result? Actually, I do not think it is that hard to argue
conceptually that such actions have caused harm to shareholders.
Investors in a benefit corporation have chosen to receive a potentially
lower financial return in order to support a company that does good in
other ways. If the company fails to follow through on its promise to act
that way, that hurts shareholders even if they come out better
financially. Other things besides money matter, and their decision to
invest in such a company reveals what matters most to these investors.
The much harder problem is quantifying that harm, which courts must
do if they are to award damages. If courts feel they cannot do this, it
could undermine efforts to hold officers and directors personally liable.
The problem is quite hard and deep, and discussion would take us too
far afield.105 I do note that in a variety of contexts both courts and
economists have tried to quantify intangible interests, with varying
results. In this instance, perhaps headway could be made by thinking
about the discount benefit corporation shareholders have accepted in
their share valuations (relative to comparable non-benefit corporations)
as a measure of the strength of their commitment to other interests.106
103. As we shall see, Delaware benefit corporations can conclusively protect their
directors from suits for damages through their exculpation clauses. See supra notes 8,
74 and accompanying text. See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
104. Actually, in Delaware, the causation requirement does not seem to apply. Cede
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367-70 (Del. 1994).
105. A very convenient yet true cop-out.
106. See Craig R. Everett, Measuring the Social Responsibility Discount for the
Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence from Benefit Corporations, 3 J. Behav. Fin. & Econ.
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Under all three statutes, the claims at issue in this section would
explicitly be protected by the deferential business judgment rule.107
However, under the business judgment rule a director or officer must be
reasonably informed before deciding, and a failure to even consider
stakeholders to whom they owe a duty would seem to show a failure to
inform oneself. Thus, for failure to consider cases, probably the leading
avenue to personal liability in our analysis, the business judgment rule
does not protect defendants. However, for failure to pursue cases in
Minnesota or failure to balance cases in Delaware, the business
judgment rule would apply, as it would in injunctive relief cases under
all three statutes. Thus, for such cases plaintiffs would need to show that
the defendants were grossly negligent in informing themselves about the
impacts of the disputed decisions on the mandated interests.
A further barrier to damage claims against directors is exculpation
clauses. As noted above, corporations may include in their charters
clauses which provide that directors are not to be held personally liable
for violations of their duty to the corporation.108 The Delaware and
Minnesota statutes explicitly allow such provisions in benefit
corporations, and one assumes the same is implicitly true for the Model
Act as well.109 Thus, in a benefit corporation with such a clause,
directors will try to dismiss a suit seeking damages by pointing to the
clause.
However, there are a variety of limitations to such clauses, the most
important being that corporations may not waive liability for violations
of the duty of loyalty or for actions that are not in good faith. In
Delaware, the good faith provision has given rise to significant case law
as plaintiffs have tried to circumvent exculpation clauses by arguing that

55, (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2143414 (attempting to quantify
benefit corporation investment discounts). I am suggesting a two-step analysis here.
The first step involves quantifying in dollars the impact of a decision on the relevant
non-shareholder constituency, using methods already developed in other contexts. The
second step involves allowing shareholder plaintiffs to collect a proportion of this dollar
amount, with the proportion depending upon the calculated investment discount—the
higher the discount, the higher the proportion received.
107. Model Act §§ 301(e), 303(e) (2013); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 365(b) (2013);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 304A.201 sub. 4 (2015); see Smith v. Van Gorkham, 488 A.2d 858,
872 (Del. 1985); supra note 71 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 74, at 795 and accompanying text.
109. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 365(c); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 304A.201 sub. 5.
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the conduct in question was not in good faith. After some vacillation, the
courts have announced a very pro-defendant standard: plaintiffs must
show a “conscious disregard” of their duties, which they parse as
occurring “[o]nly if they knowingly and completely failed to undertake
their responsibilities….”110 It would be extraordinarily hard for plaintiffs
to succeed under such a standard in a failure to pursue or failure to
balance case where defendants can point to any legitimate interest that
justifies their decision. Plaintiffs might still succeed under this standard
in a failure to consider case, in which plaintiffs could argue that
directors knew that control of a benefit corporation includes a
commitment to pursuing public benefits, and a complete failure to even
consider such benefits is a knowing and complete failure to undertake
their responsibilities.
Apparently anticipating this opportunity for plaintiffs, Delaware
makes an additional protection available to benefit corporations. The
exculpation clause of a Delaware benefit corporation may provide that
“any disinterested failure to satisfy this section shall not, for the
purposes of § 102(b)(7) or § 145 of this title, constitute an act or
omission not in good faith, or a breach of the duty of loyalty.”111 If a
corporation adopts the provision suggested by this section of the benefit
corporation statute, the good faith avenue to liability will be foreclosed.
The Model Act has no parallel provision, and so the good faith argument
remains potentially open there, albeit the opening is very, very narrow.
Minnesota follows Delaware, but not to the same extent. In Minnesota,
corporations can include a provision that a disinterested failure to satisfy
the standard of conduct does not constitute a breach of the duty of
loyalty, but that provision is silent on good faith.112 Since a lack of good
faith in a claimed duty of care violation is the main concern here, it is
not clear this provision actually reduces potential manager liability.113
The bottom line is that suits against the directors or officers of
benefit corporations seeking liability for damages face many obstacles,
as is the case with ordinary corporations. The extra duties that come into
play for a benefit corporation probably do slightly increase the risk of
110.
111.
112.
113.

Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243-44 (Del. 2009).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 365(c).
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 304A.201 sub. 5 (2014).
However, note that in Minnesota’s corporation statute, “good faith” is narrowly
defined as “honesty in fact in the conduct of the act or transaction concerned,” so the
concern about liability through that avenue may be less than in Delaware. Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 302A.001 sub. 13.
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liability as compared with the almost non-existent risk in other
corporations.114 The risk is lowest for Delaware benefit corporation
directors whose companies have adopted the strongest allowed
protection in their exculpation clause; for them, the chances of being
held personally liable for the types of action discussed here seem
vanishingly small. The risk for Model Act benefit corporation managers
is also low given the exoneration from personal liability (unless their
company has opted out of the exoneration provisions) However, there is
a narrow opening for liability in acting without good faith, specifically a
complete failure to consider non-shareholder interests that is not
exonerated and is not covered by an exculpation clause. The risk of
liability for managers is highest in Minnesota, where there is not only
some risk from a failure to consider claim, but also the possibility of a
claim for failure to pursue for an unreasonably long period of time.
Nonetheless, even in Minnesota the chances of manager liability are
small. For instance, the directors and officers of Jen & Berry’s would
almost certainly win a suit concerning the ice cream containers absent
much more damning evidence than we have seen so far. Although, if the
record shows absolutely no consideration whatsoever of the
environmental impact of the containers, a small possibility of liability
might exist.
There is some chance, though, of facing injunctive remedies for
failing to pursue or create public benefit. Neither the statutory
exonerations of personal liability nor the charter exculpation clauses
apply to claims for non-monetary remedies, such as ordering Jen &
Berry’s to switch to the more expensive containers. However, it is not
clear that possible injunctions will strike all that much fear into the
hearts of managers (although if potential remedies were to include their
removal as directors or officers, that might get their attention; the Model
Act and Delaware are mute on the nature of potential injunctive relief,
but Minnesota provides a non-exclusive list of relief available, including
director removal115). The chances of remedies actually being ordered
seem slim. The business judgment rule applies and is hard to overcome.
Courts would face a tough decision: what actions would they order to
appropriately balance the competing interests (although as just noted,
Minnesota does provide some guidance for possible relief)? The wide
114.
115.

Black et al., supra note 73.
Minn. Stat. Ann., § 304A.202 sub. 3 (2014).
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range of interests that makes the decisions of managers difficult would
affect judges too. And on top of all that, for cases to even be brought,
one would need either determined plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ lawyers, and
the latter may find it hard to see any profit in a case where no monetary
damages are possible. Although, if courts are willing to award attorney’s
fees in cases where injunctive relief is obtained, that could limit this
obstacle.116
Especially if there is some risk of monetary liability, it is worth
noting the incredible breadth of the duty at issue. Managers must
consider the effects of their decisions on shareholders, employees,
customers, the community and social factors, the environment, and
“general public benefit,” which would seem to cover everything that any
decision may impact, positively or negatively (remember though, in
Minnesota specific benefit corporations the purpose is more limited).
That’s a lot to consider, although of course even in a corporation
dedicated to maximizing profit, one must consider all of these
stakeholders insofar as their behavior affects profits. Some
commentators worry that this “many masters” problem leaves managers
with a mess of interests, all of which they must somehow consider and
balance before making a decision.117 It is certainly true that the statutes
provide no guidance as to how to balance these interests—that is a
daunting task, and some have argued that without further guidance, it
could actually hurt the quality of decision-making as managers are
overwhelmed by competing factors to consider.118 This “many masters”
problem is also at the heart of much concern that there will be less
accountability in benefit corporations, as it becomes harder to measure
performance by any one standard.119 However, as we have seen, a fear of
monetary liability, either personal or corporate, should not be an
additional source of stress when it comes to balancing competing
interests—the Model Act and Delaware do seem to preclusively
foreclose liability for failing to pursue or create public benefit, although
Minnesota leaves open the possibility.
116.
117.

Murray, supra note 21, at 39.
Loewenstein, supra note 63, at 1028-34; J. William Callison, Putting New
Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the
Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2 Am. U. Bus. L. Rev. 85, 107-09
(2012).
118. Loewenstein, supra note 63, at 1031-33.
119. Callison, supra note 117, at 110; Murray, supra note 21, at 33-35; Reiser,
supra note 16, at 697-98; Page, supra note 10, at 364.
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C. DUTY IN CONFLICTED TRANSACTIONS
At the opposite end of the fiduciary duty spectrum from ordinary
operating decisions are cases involving conflicts of interest for
managers, which implicate the duty of loyalty. As above, consider an
example to help fix our thinking. Suppose that in the Jen & Berry’s case,
the CEO owns the company from which Jen & Berry’s purchases its
containers. We might imagine alternatively either that Jen & Berry’s
buys cheap but harmful containers as above, or that it buys expensive
but sustainable containers. There is a clear conflict of interest here; how
if at all will Jen & Berry’s status as a benefit corporation potentially
affect the legal analysis of this conflict?
In ordinary corporations, as discussed above,120 managers face
significantly more risk of facing personal liability, as well as injunctive
remedies. I doubt there will be much difference in benefit corporations.
Presumably, plaintiffs bringing a loyalty case will probably not also
bring a benefit enforcement proceeding,121 nor will they invoke the duty
to consider stakeholder interests created under the Model Act. Rather,
they will bring a standard derivative or direct action (depending upon
the nature of the alleged injury) that invokes the traditional duty of
loyalty claim, i.e. the duty not to benefit at the expense of the
corporation. Thus, being a manager of a benefit corporation would not
seem to expand the scope for liability under the traditional duty of
loyalty.
But, might being a benefit corporation limit the effective scope of
the duty of loyalty? It might conceivably do so by allowing defendants
to justify their seemingly self-interested action by referring to the
interests of others who are not shareholders but are still constituencies to
whom they owe a duty. For Jen & Berry’s, if the company buys
expensive but sustainable containers from its CEO, he could justify the
additional expense as contributing to the company’s goal of
sustainability. This explanation may affect how a court reviews the
decision. The potential impact of this type of argument appears to be
greatest in cases where defendants justify their actions through
fairness.122 In such cases, the defendants must show that their decision
120.
121.
122.

See supra, note 80 and accompanying text.
See supra, note 56 and accompanying text.
See supra, note 80 and accompanying text.
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was entirely fair to the corporation, that both the process by which the
decision was made was objective and that the result was at least equal to
that of an arms-length transaction.123 The existence of multiple
legitimate constituencies may allow defendants to craft more arguments
justifying their actions, as in the Jen & Berry’s example. In other words,
“fair price” in a benefit corporation may not focus on financial return
alone, reflecting the bargain shareholders make in investing in a social
enterprise. However, for truly self-serving behavior, courts may and
should remain skeptical, and scrutinize such rationalizations closely. For
instance, if cheaper but still environmentally-friendly containers are
available elsewhere, the Jen & Berry’s CEO should not be able to
defend his conflict by pointing to the environmental justification.
There are times the benefit corporation status may actually make
the justification harder—in our Jen & Berry’s case, suppose the
company buys cheap but harmful containers from the CEO. The CEO’s
attempt to justify this as profit-maximizing will be weaker in a benefit
corporation than an ordinary for-profit. Moreover, defendants will
usually rely upon the director or shareholder approval prong rather than
the fairness prong to defend themselves.124 Even these prongs involve
some degree of judicial review of the conflicted transaction. However,
the standard of review for duty of care claims is quite weak (business
judgment review or waste). Once a court determines that level of review
is appropriate, defendants generally do not need to point to nonshareholder interests as justification. So, although benefit corporation
status may reduce the chances of liability in situations involving
conflicting interests, the reduction is likely quite small given the
deferential standard of review that is used for all corporations.
There is one significant exception to the point just made about
conflicted transactions: minority shareholder freeze-outs.125 These cases
are perhaps the one place where plaintiffs in corporate fiduciary duty
cases have a pretty good chance of success, and as a result, they play a

123.
124.
125.

See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 80, at 922-23.
See supra, note 80 and accompanying text.
In a minority freeze-out, a controlling shareholder has the corporation buy out
the shares of the minority shareholders. The controlling shareholder has the power to
approve the transaction on its own, and so the minority shareholders are forced to
accept whatever terms the controller sets.
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big role in the corporate law caseload.126 In minority shareholder freezeouts, Delaware courts, and courts that follow Delaware’s lead, have
imposed fairness review (though perhaps with a burden shift) even
where there is disinterested director or shareholder approval.127 Thus, if
benefit corporation status significantly affects the arguments defendants
can make within a fairness review standard, it could also be important in
the freeze-out context. The issue is likely to boil down to how courts
value minority shares in benefit corporations—whether or not
shareholders are receiving a fair price is, after all, the core issue in such
cases. The question of share value in benefit corporations is quite
tricky—how does one put a dollar value on how shareholders care about
goals other than profit?128 Courts will have to answer that question when
valuing the fairness of the price shareholders receive in a freeze-out.
How courts will answer that question remains quite unclear—the courts
will be facing a truly difficult problem. It may well be reasonable to
apply a discount to the value of shares in a benefit corporation, since
that is the tradeoff involved in investing in such a company.
The analysis of conflicted transactions would seem to be quite
similar for our three statutes. One possible difference may occur in
Minnesota specific benefit corporations, which only have one or a few
specified interests they must consider, rather than the vast range found
in other benefit corporations. With fewer specified interests, managers
may find it harder to point to anything that justifies their self-interested
actions.
The bottom line for conflicted transactions under all three statutes
is that the core legal landscape should not change much from that of
other non-benefit corporations. The range of arguments defendants may

126. Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, Empirical Studies of
Representative Litigation, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law
152, 157 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
127. The effect of shareholder approval has now been questioned by the Delaware
Chancery Court, and corporations have been able to evade fairness review by first
buying out most minority interests through a tender offer, though judicial review of that
maneuver is also now in flux. For an overview of Delaware law in this area, and
empirical evidence on its effect, see Fernan Restrepo & Guham Subramanian, The
Effect of Delaware Doctrine on Freezeout Structure and Outcomes: Evidence on the
Unified Approach, (Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University
Working Paper No. 153, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2297707.
128. See Everett, supra note 106.
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use to justify their conflicts under a fairness analysis could shift, leading
to an overall slightly lower risk of liability, but the change is unlikely to
be large. A larger reduction in the expected value of what successful
plaintiffs receive may result if courts apply a discount to the value of
shares in benefit corporations. This could somewhat reduce the deterrent
effect of loyalty cases, but seems to appropriately reflect the deal
implicitly struck by benefit corporation investors, who, after all, chose
to receive a lower return on their investment.
D. DUTY IN CHANGES OF CONTROL
Benefit corporation status may also have a notable effect in
situations implicating changes in control, particularly sales of control.
As is the case with conflicted transactions, the main issue here seems to
be whether or not consideration of non-shareholder interests may
weaken the heightened judicial scrutiny that applies in these situations.
For defenses against hostile takeovers, where the Unocal standard
applies,129 the answer would seem to be that benefit corporation status is
likely to have little effect. Under Unocal, defendants can already invoke
non-shareholder interests to some extent, although benefit corporation
defendants may find it easier to do so insofar as they need not make any
showing that pursuing the non-shareholder interest will not hurt
shareholders.130 As a result, benefit corporation status would expand the
justificatory arguments for defendants somewhat, but not tremendously
so. More importantly, defendants already prevail in cases applying the
Unocal standard most of the time, and they usually do not need any
additional arguments that benefit corporation status may make available
to them.
Matters differ in sales of control in which the Revlon standard
applies (assuming the state courts in question follow Delaware’s
approach).131 Courts do apply more searching scrutiny under Revlon, and
defendants face notably more chance of losing their argument and facing
some sort of judicial remedy. One important part of that heightened
scrutiny is that courts impose a quite precise objective on managers:
managers must use reasonable efforts to get the best price available for
129.
130.

See supra section II.A for a discussion of the Unocal and Revlon standards.
The effect of benefit corporation status should be even weaker in states with
constituency statutes, as in such states reference to non-shareholder interests as a
defense has been even more explicitly allowed in ordinary corporations.
131. See supra section II.A.
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their shareholders. That precise objective is inappropriate for a benefit
corporation. It remains to be seen how courts faced with a benefit
corporation in a situation that triggers Revlon duties will define the
objective that managers must pursue. One scholar has plausibly
suggested that courts should look to how the proposed sale will affect
the blended profit and social purpose of the benefit corporation.132 She
suggests courts primarily engage in heightened scrutiny of the process
that a board followed in approving a sale and that in this process the
board should refer to social accounting metrics to try to give some
substance and precision to that inquiry.133 That makes sense logically,
but inevitably the goal will be less defined than it is under Revlon, which
gives defendant managers more room to justify the sale to a preferred
buyer or at a lower price. Thus, judicial scrutiny of sales of control
appears likely to be weaker for benefit corporations.
There is a contradictory possibility, though. Some shareholders
might use this blended purpose standard in a revised Revlon situation to
oppose a sale that might benefit shareholders but hurt other
stakeholders. Imagine minority shareholders in our fictional Jen &
Berry’s who bought into the company because they believed in its social
commitments and were upset to see it selling itself to a traditional forprofit corporation, Trash-the-Earth Monster Corp. How would a court
evaluate a suit claiming that the sale was a violation of the board’s duty
to the company? I suspect such a claim would not succeed, as courts are
unlikely to second-guess the judgment of management in such a
situation, at least outside of truly extreme situations where the sale
involves a complete abandonment of a company’s social mission
(perhaps the name of the acquirer in this instance suggests such a case?).
But benefit corporation status does create a new theory for liability in
such circumstances, which increases, at least a bit, the risk of courts
granting relief under a modified Revlon approach. This potential
increase in liability mirrors a point we have already seen in waste review
of operating decisions and fairness review of conflicted decisions.134 In
some circumstances, benefit corporation status expands the ability of
132. Plerhoples, supra note 28, at 262-63; but cf. J. Haskell Murray, Defending
Patagonia: Mergers and Acquisitions with Benefit Corporations, 9 Hastings Bus. L.J.
485, 511-12 (2013) (arguing that once directors have decided to sell their company they
should be required to sell to the highest bidder).
133. Plerhoples, supra note 28, at 263.
134. See supra, notes 101, 124 and accompanying text.
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defendants to justify their actions by referring to non-shareholder
interests, but in other circumstances that status may expand the ability of
plaintiffs to argue that an action was harmful by pointing to those same
interests. My guess is that in all of these cases, the net effect favors
defendants across the broad range of possible circumstances, as courts
will be unwilling to allow plaintiffs to use benefit corporation status to
push outcomes that actively harm shareholders. However, a deep
ambiguity does exist.
It is even possible that the direction of the net effect differs for
different types of remedies. For modest injunctive remedies, such as
providing more information to shareholders before voting on an
acquisition, perhaps courts will be willing to expand the reach of Revlon
duties a bit for benefit corporations. However, for personal liability of
managers, where one must show bad faith (at least under Delaware’s
current approach),135 the increased vagueness of the corporate goal
seems to make liability even less likely than it is for ordinary
corporations. Since monetary liability has a much stronger deterrent
effect than injunctive remedies, especially compared to the modest
injunctions one might see under any sort of expanded Revlon analysis,
such a split outcome for different types of remedies would still on
balance seem to lead to a weakening of the impact of Revlon on
managers.
However, that weakening should be understood against the already
weakening power of Revlon for ordinary corporations. As noted
above,136 the scope of circumstances in which Revlon applies is quite
limited. Excluding many circumstances which would appear to involve
real changes in control, and even where Revlon does apply, directors
will only face personal liability if they fail to act in good faith in while
pursuing their duty. Such a strict standard is unlikely to lead to liability.
So, a further weakening of an already weak Revlon is not all that
significant a change for benefit corporations.
The analysis in change of control cases would also seem to be very
similar for each of the Delaware, Minnesota, and Model Acts. Perhaps
the suggestion that personal liability would be even more unlikely under
a good faith standard given the less precise goal of benefit corporation
directors137 becomes a stronger conclusion for Delaware companies that
135.
136.
137.

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
See supra section II.A.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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choose to adopt the suggested provision absolving directors of good
faith liability. The Revlon analysis may be a bit different for specific
benefit corporations in Minnesota. Where shareholders invoke Revlon
duties on a claim that a sale is being made at too low a price, the board
of a specific benefit corporation will have fewer alternative interests to
point to in justifying itself than a general benefit corporation would, so
the weakening of judicial review may be less. Where shareholders
instead try to use benefit corporation status to block a deal that has a
good price but hurts other stakeholders, specific benefit corporations
differ more ambivalently: there are fewer alternative stakeholders to
which a board may point, but if the specific benefit purpose is indeed
hurt by the deal, that may get a closer hearing from a court precisely
because of the greater focus of the duty.
E. SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS
Pulling together our analysis of the duty provisions, the effect of
benefit corporation status on fiduciary duty cases, as compared with
what we observe for other corporations, is mixed. For cases involving
ordinary operating decisions, benefit corporation status may slightly
increase the chances of liability, although that increase comes from a
very low starting point. The increased risk of liability is greatest under
the Minnesota Act and smallest for Delaware benefit corporations that
choose the maximum allowed protection under exculpation clauses. For
cases involving conflicted transactions, there may be a slight decrease in
the chances of liability, and a greater decrease in expected damages
where liability does occur. For cases involving a sale of control, there
may be a rather small decrease in the chances of liability in some
circumstances and an increase in others. Thus, benefit corporation status
may bring about a modest flattening of the chances of fiduciary duty
liability. For causes of action where the odds of liability are traditionally
low, benefit corporation status raises the chances of liability, while for
causes of action where the odds of liability are traditionally higher,
benefit corporation status lowers those odds. The effects are probably
quite modest, but serious uncertainty exists regarding the size and
perhaps even direction of those effects and in the limited but important
context of minority freeze-outs, the size of the reduced expected value
of damages may be greater.
A final issue to ponder in this section is the effect on the
availability and expense of directors’ and officers’ (“D & O”) liability

2014] COMMITTING TO DOING GOOD AND DOING WELL

57

insurance for benefit corporations.138 If the overall effects of benefit
corporation status are quite limited, then one should expect that
ultimately D & O insurance should be available on similar terms for
benefit corporations. However, two factors cause some concern that
insurance will be more expensive, at least initially. One is the simple
fact of uncertainty—the net effects may turn out to be limited, but that
will not be fully clear until we have some experience with how courts
handle cases involving benefit corporations. Until then, the existence of
uncertainty may cause insurers to charge higher premiums to
compensate for that risk. A second factor pointing to higher premiums
comes from considering the flattening of the risk of liability. Liability
will be slightly more likely for ordinary operating decisions, but slightly
less likely (or at least with lower expected damages) in conflict cases.
But note that D & O policies exclude claims involving fraud or personal
enrichment.139 Thus, it may be that there is a greater risk of liability in
benefit corporations for those classes of cases covered by the policies.
None of these changes in the chances of liability are likely to be
extreme. The broad picture is that directors and officers are roughly as
likely to face successful suits claiming a violation of fiduciary duty
within benefit corporations as they are within other corporations, and
most of the suits are likely to fail. Still, we do see some flattening of the
probability of liability for benefit corporations, with suits having the
lowest probability of success becoming a bit more hopeful for plaintiffs,
and those having the highest probability of success becoming a bit less
hopeful. There is also some risk that, especially at first, D & O insurance
may become more expensive. Now we must ask what this legal analysis,
if correct, implies for how benefit corporations are likely to function.
IV. ARE THE DUTY PROVISIONS TOO STRONG, TOO WEAK, OR JUST
RIGHT?
Having gone through a detailed legal analysis of how the benefit
corporation duty provisions might be applied in the leading categories of
fiduciary duty cases, we move on to ask what that analysis suggests for
how benefit corporations are likely to fare in practice. Will the duty
138. Sean J. Griffith, D&O Insurance and the Ability of Shareholder Litigation to
Deter, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law 337 (Claire A. Hill
& Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012); Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Ensuring Corporate
Misconduct: How Liability Insurance Undermines Shareholder Litigation (2010).
139. Griffith, supra note 138, at 339.
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provisions encourage or discourage the creation of this new type of
entity? Will directors and officers be scared off by the prospects of
liability? Will investors, consumers, and employees believe the duty
rules create a credible commitment to interests other than maximizing
shareholder wealth? Will the rules help push managers to consider the
broad range of interests mandated legally, and will those rules be of any
help in providing guidance as to how to balance all of those interests?
The duty provisions could go wrong in at least two opposing
directions. If the duty provisions are too demanding, they could make
directors and officers loathe to become involved in such corporations,
and could result in few companies choosing to adopt the form. Even for
those that do adopt the form, overly strong duties could lead to suboptimal risk aversion or to costly legalistic check-the-box procedures
that protect against liability while accomplishing little of any real worth.
On the other hand, if the duty provisions are too weak, they could lead
to greenwashing.140 Although corporations which adopt the form would
seem to be committing to considering public benefits, in fact the
commitment would be legally empty. If investors and customers do not
catch on to the reality, the form would be perpetuating a kind of fraud,
in essence. If they do catch on, the form would come to have no
branding value, and there would be little point to adopting it. Many
academic commentators to date fear that the duties will be too weak.141
However, the structure of benefit corporation statutes combined with my
own experience serving on a committee drafting such a statute suggests
that many practicing lawyers, at least those on the transactional and
corporate defendant side of the bar, fear that the duties could be too
strong.
In this section I will explore each possibility, that the duty
provisions may be too strong or too weak (or maybe even both
simultaneously—there’s a cheery thought). Given the newness and
uncertainty surrounding the statutes, both are real possibilities. It is also
possible, though, that the statutes (or at least some of them) have struck
a sensible balance which largely manages to avoid being either too
strong or too weak, and thus gives benefit corporations a way to commit
140. In other words, causing it to seem as if a company is pursuing environmental
and other social interests, when in fact it is doing nothing of the sort.
141. Callison, supra note 117, at 110; Murray, supra note 21, at 33-35; Reiser,
supra note 16, at 697-98; Page, supra note 10, at 364.
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to pursuing public benefits while still not scaring off managers and
entrepreneurs with the threat of ruinous lawsuits. For now, I am giving
these new statutes the benefit of the doubt, and suggesting that they have
succeeded in finding this sweet spot.
A. TOO STRONG
First consider the possibility that the duty provisions are too strong.
As just noted, in a worst-case scenario this could lead to complete
failure of this new form of business association. Directors and officers
may refuse to join benefit corporations out of fear of potential liability,
or insist on unrealistically high pay to compensate for that threat, or the
costs of obtaining D & O liability insurance may be too high. Their
reluctance to become involved could in turn lead to few companies
choosing to become benefit corporations, and those who do try the form
may terminate the experiment if they find it hard to attract directors and
officers. Or, overly threatening duties could have a more limited but still
negative effect. Companies could respond to the threat of liability with
cumbersome, check-the-box procedures that ensure they have kept a
paper record of considering all relevant stakeholder interests, which they
can readily produce should they ever get sued. The fear is that such
procedures may add monetary costs and time to decisions while doing
little to actually improve decision-making in the intended direction.
Perhaps even worse, fear of liability could lead managers to choose less
risky options, which are less likely to provoke lawsuits.142 Such an
outcome would be a less obvious failure than no one adopting the
benefit corporation form at all, but might actually create a net negative
effect from creation of the form. At least if no one adopts the form, no
harm is done.
It is probably fear of monetary damages, and particularly damages
felt personally by directors or officers, which would be most likely to
create such problems. Even a relatively small expected increase in
expected liability could cause trouble if there is much uncertainty
surrounding the statutes—insofar as the amounts at stake can be quite
large, even quite small chances of liability could cause corporate
managers to beware. Furthermore, legal advisors may exacerbate the
142. All of the arguments given here are also arguments given to justify weak
judicial scrutiny of boards in ordinary corporations. See Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Corporation Law and Economics, 253-69 (2002).
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situation with cautious advice in the face of novel statutes which have
not yet been interpreted.143 Does anything in the legal analysis above
suggest such an outcome?
Perhaps. All three benefit corporation statutes that we have
considered seem to increase the probability of liability in duty of care
cases involving ordinary operating decisions. The increased probability
appears quite modest indeed, particularly for corporations that protect
themselves with exculpation clauses.144 However, there is uncertainty
surrounding the analysis, and as just noted even small chances of
liability in a quite uncertain environment could cause problems. The
uncertainty may also lead to high D & O liability insurance premiums.
Though not all approve, states have adopted the business judgment rule
and exculpation clauses for ordinary operating decisions in order to give
managers plenty of room to take calculated risks and to encourage
qualified persons to become officers and directors.145 Ordinary operating
decisions are pervasive (particularly when one takes into account that
duty applies to failures to act as well as acts taken) and present less risk
of opportunism than conflicted transactions and changes of control. We
do not want managers constantly acting in fear. So increasing the risk of
liability for such decisions, as benefit corporation statutes seem to do, is
a concern.
The risk is lowest for Delaware, at least for corporations which
adopt exculpation clauses to the fullest extent allowed. Indeed, for such
corporations we saw that the risk of director personal liability may not
be any greater for benefit corporations than for other corporations, i.e.
almost no risk at all.146 This risk is somewhat greater under the Model
Act, and highest in Minnesota.147 However, one should not exaggerate:
the business judgment rule and exculpation clauses make personal
liability in duty of care cases almost impossible,148 and the increases
under any of the benefit corporation statutes are all extremely modest, it
would seem. Thus, unless one believes that it is critical to essentially
rule out all possibility of liability for ordinary operating decisions, I find
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 259-63.
See supra notes 108-113 and accompanying text.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 Vand. L. Rev. 83, 109-29 (2004).
146. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
148. Black et al., supra note 73, at 1089-1093.
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it rather hard to believe that the benefit corporation statutes will scare
everyone away from being a director or officer in a benefit corporation.
This point is strengthened by the fact that we have seen that the
benefit corporation statutes would actually appear to decrease the
chances of liability in conflicted transaction or change of control
cases.149 For ordinary corporations, these are the cases where defendants
have a real chance of being held liable, so even relatively small
decreases in liability for these types of cases may swamp the effect of
increased liability in the duty of care context. Note, though, that the
effect on liability in change of control cases was actually ambivalent.
Although it may prove harder for shareholders of benefit corporations to
claim that they will receive an overly low price in an acquisition under a
Revlon analysis, there may be new room to sue claiming that an
acquisition will hurt other affected stakeholders.150 That may discourage
some acquisitions that would be good for the shareholders of the
company to be acquired. However, protecting other stakeholders in such
circumstances is one of the main selling points of benefit corporations—
shareholders who have chosen to buy into a benefit corporation will
have little cause to complain. There is a long debate in the scholarly
literature on acquisitions as to whether the benefits to target
shareholders in a number of instances come at the expense of other
stakeholders, but there is at least a reputable case to be made that such
harm to stakeholders is indeed a common problem in acquisitions.151
The revised Revlon analysis in benefit corporations should protect
stakeholders from such harm.
For these reasons, I suspect that the concern that the threat of
liability will scare away managers and stop anyone from forming benefit
corporations will not be borne out.152 The net effect of benefit
corporation status on potential personal liability is unclear—it could
well decrease the probability of being held liable once one takes into
account all possible classes of claims. A more plausible concern,
though, is that benefit corporation status could distort board or officer
behavior in the ordinary operating decision context, where an increased
149.
150.
151.

See supra sections II.C and II.D.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile
Takeovers, in Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences 33-35 (Alan J. Auerbach
ed., 1988).
152. Of course, people may refrain from forming benefit corporations for other
reasons.
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chance of liability does exist. I would expect that at least for decisions
made at the board level, counsel will advise creating a record that the
company has considered the effect of its decisions on the mandated
stakeholders—quite a number of them, one recalls.153 It will be
interesting to see how they do this, and how much inquiry boards make
as to the effects of their actions. These procedures will certainly have
some costs, at least monetary and time costs, and possibly in some
instances a cost of leading to more risk risk-averse behavior (though it
may be disputed whether this is a cost or a benefit). A major issue then
becomes whether the new procedures have any benefits. The hope is that
they will. The checklists will at least force managers to pay some
attention to the effect of their decisions on the interests of various
constituencies. Particularly if they have any motivation at all to actually
give those interests some weight (and assumedly most will), the constant
reminder may be useful.
B. TOO WEAK
An opposing possibility is that the benefit corporation fiduciary
duty provisions will turn out to be too weak. This could happen if the
chances of being held liable for ignoring the commitment to pursue nonshareholder interests are so low that managers feel they can safely
ignore the risk. This could play out in at least two different ways. One
would occur if investors and customers are unaware that the duties are
so weak. That would be a case of successful greenwashing, successful at
least from the perspective of managers who would essentially be
perpetuating a fraud.154 They would be making a show of committing to
pursuing public benefit in order to attract investors and customers, but
would have no intent of actually following through on that commitment,
and the law would not punish them for it.155 The other way in which
overly weak duties might play out would occur if investors and
153.
154.

See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
Callison, supra note 117, at 109-10; Murray, supra note 21, at 33; Page, supra
note 10, at 364.
155. Of course, other mechanisms besides the threat of fiduciary duty suits may
protect against such greenwashing. Of most relevance for the benefit corporation
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article.
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customers became aware of the weakness. In that case, the legal
commitment to pursuing public benefit would have ceased to be
credible. Insofar as making such a commitment is a, maybe the, key
benefit of being a benefit corporation, such a development may well
undermine the whole point of the new legal form, giving organizers little
reason to adopt it. If investors and customers see benefit corporation
status as mere greenwashing, they will not be any more eager to invest
in benefit corporations than in ordinary for-profits. Benefit corporation
status would then give no brand value. If that is the case, then why
would anyone want to form a benefit corporation?
Our legal analysis also leaves this open as a possibility. Even if
benefit corporation status does increase the chances of liability for
ordinary operating decisions, we have seen that such increases may be
very small and increase from a starting point of almost no chance of
being held liable in ordinary corporations.156 The result may be that
liability for ordinary operating decisions remains so unlikely even in a
benefit corporation that managers can safely ignore it. That would be
particularly true if they are able to obtain directors and officers liability
insurance at a reasonable cost, so that they would be able to avoid
paying out on judgments even in the unlikely event that a court held
them personally liable for failing to consider or pursue a nonstakeholder interest.157 The risk of under-deterrence is greatest in
Delaware corporations with exculpation clauses that extend as far as
allowed, and least in Minnesota, but the possibility is present for benefit
corporations under all three statutes considered here. Those who are
skeptical about the evasion of liability and responsibility in fiduciary
duty in ordinary corporations158 may be particularly inclined to believe
that the same situation is replicated in benefit corporation statutes,
which as we have seen draw heavily upon the same protections against
liability one finds in traditional corporate law.
How much should we worry about the risk that the statutory duty
provisions will be too weak? Although I cannot dismiss the possibility,
there are reasons to doubt it will turn out to be true. One can start to see
this by simply looking back at the reasons why one might fear that the

156.
157.
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See supra section II.B.
See Griffith, supra note 138, at 348-49.
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duty provisions will be too strong. Given the pervasiveness of ordinary
operating decisions, the potential for high losses if liability does occur,
and the serious uncertainty that surrounds the new statutes, even quite
modest increases in the chances of liability may be enough to strike fear
into the hearts of managers. And note that the duty provisions will not
be operating in a vacuum. Other mechanisms will be working to help
commit managers to pursuing public benefits, including both
reputational concerns (aided by the required benefit reports) and
corporate cultures which one hopes will take hold in benefit
corporations, which after all are not being forced on anyone. The duty
provisions do not have to create a credible commitment all on their own;
rather, they should be seen as a complementary part of a package of
strategies which will guide and constrain the directors and officers of
benefit corporations.159
The risk of too little deterrence may look greater for conflicted
transactions and change of control circumstances. After all, this is where
the law has for good reasons chosen to impose tougher scrutiny, and we
have seen that the benefit corporation duty provisions may weaken that
scrutiny. How big a concern is this? For conflicted transactions, if
benefit corporation managers find it notably easier to evade liability by
pointing to benefits to other stakeholders in interested transactions, that
would indeed be a real concern. It is a point that bears watching, but as
noted above,160 the more likely effect in conflicted transactions will be
that courts will find a somewhat lower fair price for shareholders in
benefit corporations than in other comparable corporations. That just
reflects the bargain that shareholders make by investing in benefit
corporations, so should not be a source of alarm.
In changes of control, we have seen that there are effects in
opposing directions. The weakening of liability comes in circumstances
where managers get a lower price for shareholders than they could have
but can justify it by pointing to the interests of other stakeholders.161
However, protecting other stakeholders from harmful acquisitions is one
of the main points of benefit corporations, so those who choose to invest
in the form should not complain about this effect.

159.
160.
161.

See Yockey, supra note 14, at 28-42.
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C. TOO STRONG AND TOO WEAK
We have thus considered the possibility that benefit corporation
duty provisions will be too strong and that they will be too weak. There
are arguments for each possibility, but also some good arguments
against each. It is also possible that the duty provisions are
simultaneously both too strong and too weak. They could be so in
several ways. For one, the increased chances of liability may be enough
to deter entrepreneurs, directors, and officers who would be inclined to
honestly try to follow the rules, while not deterring those who want to
use benefit corporation status to greenwash. The latter may be focused
on ill-gotten short term gains with the intent to have disappeared before
the law might catch them, may be less risk averse or less guided by
prudent legal counsel, or may simply be less constrained by internal
moral considerations. For another, the flattening of the chances of
liability we have observed could be seen to be wrong-headed.
Traditional corporate law has made ordinary operating decisions safe
from the risk of liability while making liability more of a threat in
conflict transactions and changes of control for a reason,162 and
weakening those tendencies in benefit corporations may not be a good
idea. Finally, insofar as benefit corporations lead to formalistic
compliance procedures which come at a cost but with little benefit, the
rules could be seen as being simultaneously too strong (imposing costly
procedure) and too weak (not changing behavior as desired).
D. JUST RIGHT
I cannot rule out any of the aforementioned possibilities. Indeed,
they are all real risks for the benefit corporation statutes as written. The
exact distribution of the risks varies by statute (risk of being overly
weak greatest for Delaware, risk of being overly strong greatest for
Minnesota), but each statute considered here is subject to all of the risks
just discussed. And yet, there is also reason to hope that the statutes
have struck a proper balance.
To start to see why, consider that the situation for ordinary
operating decisions in benefit corporations rather closely resembles the
status of the duty to monitor risk within standard corporate law.
Directors may (the point remains murky) have a duty to put in place and
162.

Hill & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 134-38.
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oversee a plan or system for monitoring the risks to which their
company is exposing itself.163 Because this duty, to the extent that it
exists, falls under the good faith extension of the duty of loyalty, the
chances of liability are slightly higher than under the duty of care. And
yet, the chances of liability are still very slight.164 I have argued
elsewhere that this combination may be optimal for the duty to monitor
risk,165 and the same may well be true for the duty to consider nonshareholder stakeholders of benefit corporations.
The risk of liability should be slight because there is little reason to
suspect managerial decision-making in the context of ordinary decisions
where no director or officer has a conflicting interest, and the risk
should not be so great as to scare off managers or make them overly risk
averse. We have already discussed the latter points under the risks of
overly likely liability. As for why we do not have strong reason to be
suspicious of managers, in part that is because for these kinds of
decisions managers do not have strong self-interested incentives to
ignore their duties. Moreover, those attracted to become involved in
benefit corporations are likely to be persons with a normative
commitment to doing good. Non-legal mechanisms will help constrain
them to follow such a commitment through their interactions with
investors, customers, and employees. Benefit corporation managers who
are visibly shirking their duties to do good will most likely find
themselves not doing well either, as the various stakeholders withdraw
their support from the company.
Why then have any sort of a risk of liability at all? First, the
difficulty for outsiders in monitoring many decisions means some bad
apples may be able to hide within the benefit corporation form. Those
who genuinely want to advance public benefit hope to signal that intent
by adopting the form. For that signal to be credible, there must be some
cost to those who adopt the form under false pretenses.166 The risk of
liability for ignoring stakeholder interests creates such a cost. Those
who plan to abide by their duty hopefully face less risk of liability than
those who do not.

163. Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight Duties
after the Financial Crisis, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 859, 861-64 (2013).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 872-77.
166. Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 17, at 155.

2014] COMMITTING TO DOING GOOD AND DOING WELL

67

But that signaling effect is probably modest given the low risk of
liability. For fiduciary duties to be helpful, something more needs to be
in play. That something more may be the norm-shaping role of courts
deciding duty cases. Even in a case where the defendants escape
liability, the court may lecture them as to how they could have done a
better job. That dicta can help shape the norms of corporate directors
and officers, instructing them as to how to best perform their jobs. Many
have posited that this is a leading function of Delaware fiduciary duty
cases.167 There is a dialogue over time between boards and officers,
lawyers, other gatekeepers in the corporate world, and the courts. Courts
look to companies and communities for emerging best practices, and
articulate them in their opinions. At least where a court has become
salient to the relevant community, those opinions in turn help shape
behavior in companies that lag in adopting best practices. 168
It may well be, though, that a residual chance of liability is needed
for the courts to play this role. Why, after all, should highly experienced
and knowledgeable professionals pay attention to the opinions of judges,
even judges with the extensive knowledge of corporate reality that one
finds in Delaware? A big part of the answer to that question may be that
if you ignore the judges, there’s a chance, albeit a very small chance,
that you might find yourself losing a long and nasty court battle. Even a
whiff of that threat may be enough to grab the attention of most
directors and officers.
Even assuming that is a good picture of how Delaware law works
for ordinary corporations, will it work for benefit corporations? The
legal structure of duties analyzed in the previous section is consistent
with this norm-shaping story. However, there could be a problem with
167. Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal
Penumbra of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 333, 355-57 (2009);
Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners, Apostles
and Epistles, 2009 Mich. St. L. Rev. 847, 865-73 (2009); Edward B. Rock, Saints and
Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009, 1068-72
(1997); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 437, 465-67 (1993).
168. Daniel Kleinberger has argued that the “plethora of ‘best practices’ documents .
. . provide a starting point to return the duty of care to Delaware law.” See Kleinberger,
supra note 158, at 768. Joseph Yockey has a strong analysis, drawing on new
governance theories, of how this process might work for benefit corporations. See
Yockey, supra note 14, at 32-35. For an analysis of the role of industry customs and
social norms in helping courts define fiduciary duties, see generally D. Gordon Smith &
Jordan C. Lee, Fiduciary Discretion, 75 Ohio St. L.J. 609 (2014).
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courts playing the sermonizing role for benefit corporations. For
ordinary corporations, Delaware courts do the sermonizing. The
dominant role of Delaware in the market for incorporation for public
corporations makes that possible.169 Will Delaware dominate the scene
for benefit corporations? If most benefit corporations are privately held,
it would seem unlikely. Most privately held corporations incorporate in
their home states, not Delaware.170 There is no apparent reason to expect
any difference for privately held benefit corporations. Even for benefit
corporations which are public, it remains to be seen whether Delaware
becomes a desirable state of incorporation. Delaware courts are part of
the dominant milieu which emphasizes the interests of shareholders,
after all.171 How enthusiastically will those courts embrace a new form
with a different goal? Will the founders of benefit corporations trust
Delaware, whose culture may not fit their own? There are reasons for
skepticism. On the other hand, the ability of Delaware to somewhat
extend its strong position among corporations to larger limited liability
companies172 does suggest that Delaware’s dominance can be extended
to new legal forms.
If Delaware does not attract many benefit corporations, and hence
Delaware courts do not hear many benefit corporation cases, who will
pick up the slack in articulating standards of behavior? If one state
establishes a particularly strong reputation for benefit corporations, it
might start attracting them, and eventually enough cases from that
state’s courts could build up a useful body of law.173 However, for now
there seem no obvious candidates for such a state, and the process of
building up precedents and expertise would in any event take quite a
while. Thus, courts are going to have to share the job, with case law
slowly accreting among a number of states. The fact that most statutes
are based upon the Model Act should help give more continuity to that
body of law across states. Will the resulting dialogue between
169. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 Yale L.J. 553, 590-99
(2002).
170. Id. at 568-72.
171. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
172. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Why Delaware LLCs?, 91 Ore. L. Rev. 57, 59 (2012).
173. For more on this process of a state’s court building up a reputation for expertise
and thereby attracting more corporations to it, see Michael Klausner, Corporations,
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757 (1995).
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corporations and courts be enough to help articulate widely-shared and
useful norms of proper behavior for the directors and officers of benefit
corporations? Time will tell—a cop out, but one cannot really say more
at this early stage.
The above argument that the benefit corporation duty provisions
have struck a proper balance focuses on ordinary operating decisions. It
should also be considered whether the balance looks proper for
conflicted transactions and changes of control. As previously argued,174
it is a concern that managers will be able to defend themselves in
conflict situations by pointing to the interests of other stakeholders to
justify their decisions. Courts should be wary of such arguments—
conflicted transactions trigger heightened judicial scrutiny for a reason,
and courts should be skeptical of attempted justifications. One major
change that may well be noticeable is that shareholders in minority
freeze-outs will receive lower prices, reflecting a benefit corporation
discount. That, as noted above,175 seems an appropriate reflection of the
implicit initial deal struck with investors in this new form.
We have seen that the risk of liability in changes of control has
countervailing shifts. It will be harder for shareholders of benefit
corporations to make a successful Revlon claim that they have received
too low a price, but in other circumstances they will be able to make a
claim that other stakeholders have been hurt by a sale of control.176
Again, this shift seems appropriate given the differing priorities of
benefit corporations.
Finally, most of our discussion of the effects of the fiduciary duty
provisions has focused on the probability of directors and officers being
held personally liable for duty violations. That is because the prospect of
personal liability is the type of relief which is most likely to dramatically
affect managerial behavior, for better and for worse. However, we
should also briefly consider the possibility of injunctive relief for
violation of the duty owed to non-shareholder constituencies. After all,
such relief is rather more likely to occur than monetary damages. Both
the statutory exonerations of monetary damages and the exculpation
clauses, which are the main sources of limits on the availability of
damages, do not apply to injunctive relief. The business judgment rule
does still apply, so injunctive relief will still be quite unlikely for
174.
175.
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ordinary operating decisions, though it will be more likely than
monetary damages. Injunctive relief is a more important consideration in
changes of control. As noted above, at least in the Delaware Revlon
jurisprudence, damages have become quite unlikely, so that the main
relief in Revlon cases is injunctive.177 Courts may enjoin an acquisition
completely, but more frequently they delay the shareholder vote on an
acquisition until more complete disclosure concerning the alleged defect
can be made.178 Such modest relief may do some good by highlighting
the effects a proposed sale of a benefit corporation would have on nonshareholder constituencies, and at least it is unlikely to do harm.
CONCLUSION
Although our focus has been on fiduciary duty within benefit
corporations, the law of fiduciary duty is not ultimately what will make
or break the benefit corporation as a new way of doing business. Indeed,
the new benefit corporation statutes themselves are not the critical
element in the success or failure of this new form of business
association. The critical element is the thousands of entrepreneurs,
investors, employees, and consumers who want to achieve personal
success while also benefiting the world and society. They face both new
challenges and new versions of old challenges that all forms of business
association must face. They must come up with new institutions,
practices, and strategies to meet these challenges. How well those
solutions are designed will ultimately determine the fate of benefit
corporations, both individually and collectively.
The law of benefit corporations, including fiduciary duty law, is
subordinate in importance and purpose to these individual and social
actions. The point of the law is to help address some of the challenges
which face benefit corporations, but the law will not do so on its own. It
will function as one tool among many, and will work to supplement
rather than replace the market-based institutions which are
developing.179
The core challenge at which the law is aimed is helping ensure that
the managers (directors and officers) of benefit corporations actually
177.
178.
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follow through on their commitment to pursue public benefit along with
profit. That challenge can in turn be broken down into two parts:
deterring and punishing managers who do not honestly intend to abide
by their commitments, and guiding managers who do intend to do so by
articulating standards of behavior and best practices. Both the reporting
requirements and the new fiduciary duties, the two main elements of the
benefit corporation statutes, may help to address these two challenges.
This article has focused on the role of fiduciary duty.
The existence of the two parts of this challenge points to a core
dilemma for the law. If its only goal were to deter and punish those
acting in bad faith when they commit to this new form, then the law
could afford to be more aggressive and harsh in its treatment of
perceived wrongdoers. And yet, the difficulty of telling how to best
pursue the multi-pronged goals of a benefit corporation suggests that if
courts are more aggressive, they will often punish those acting in good
faith, and the risk of that happening may keep persons of good faith
from becoming involved in benefit corporations, or may cause them to
be overly cautious or to take costly and wasteful self-protective actions.
The duty provisions of benefit corporation statutes attempt to
square this circle in a way that, unsurprisingly, closely resembles the
strategy of fiduciary duty law in all corporations. Most decisions create
very little risk of liability, but that risk is just slightly higher within
benefit corporations. Managers who completely ignore their nonshareholder constituencies do create a risk for themselves. It should not
be terribly hard to alleviate that risk by showing that one has considered
the effects of a decision on all mandated interests, but one hopes that the
need to keep all those interests in mind at some level will be easier to
bear for those who genuinely want to do so than those who do not, so
that the existence of duties will help screen out bad faith managers.
In benefit corporations, as with all corporations, the courts will look
much more closely where managers make decisions that benefit
themselves in ways different from the corporation. A concern identified
here with benefit corporations is that managers will find it easier to
justify such decisions by pointing to non-shareholder interests; courts
will need to guard against those arguments, and apply fairness scrutiny
(where it applies) with rigor. In change of control transactions, boards
will find it easier to negotiate lower premiums for shareholders, but may
have to worry that if a transaction hurts another mandated interest
enough, they will face a suit, and that tradeoff is as it should be given
the purposes of benefit corporations.
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The benefit corporation statutes themselves do little to help in the
second part of our challenge, providing guidance as to how to make a
decision where various interests conflict. However, the statutes will
hopefully set in play processes, which over time will provide some help.
As courts decide duty cases, even where they do not impose liability,
they will still articulate best practices, and will point out where directors
and officers have not done their jobs well. These judicial discussions
will both draw upon emerging best practices and also help reinforce and
refine them. Only slight risk of liability will exist for not heeding the
courts’ articulation of best practices, but that slight risk may be enough
to get many directors and officers to pay attention to what courts say.
The other main element of the statutes, the mandated regular reports
following third party standards for reporting and measuring how actions
affect the public interest, will also help shed light on best practices.
These legal strategies would not work without various actors in the
marketplace doing the hard work to create those best practices, and that
work is more important than anything the statutes or courts can do.
However, there is at least some real hope that these new laws can
support entrepreneurs, managers, and investors as they create
institutions and norms which shape a new form of business in which
they can do good while still doing well.

